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Information and Communication Technologies in Areas of Limited Statehood
Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of information and communication technology (ICT) on gov-
ernance where the state‘s ability to authoritatively implement and enforce political decisions 
is weak or functionally absent – areas of limited statehood (AoLS). How do ICTs influence the 
provision of collective goods in AoLS, especially in policy fields such as security, welfare and 
the environment? In addressing this question we focus on the emergence of ICT-enabled 
forms of steering. Virtual organizations such as Ushahidi and FrontlineSMS enable the co-
ordination of collective goods without the same level of hierarchical structure historically 
associated with traditional forms of governance. The focus lies on quasi-organizational forms 
that rely on mass collaborative action across electronic networks. The consideration of these 
questions is supported by fieldwork in Africa in 2011, and on previous research in Afghanistan 
and various African countries in 2010. The paper concludes with some tentative hypotheses 
on the interconnection between ICT, statehood and governance.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Arbeitspapier analysiert die Effekte von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnolo-
gien (ICT) in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit (RbS) mit Bezug auf Governance. Es geht dabei 
v.a. der Frage nach, wie ICTs die Bereitstellung kollektiver Güter insbesondere in den Politik-
feldern Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt und Umwelt beeinflussen. Bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage 
konzentrieren wir uns auf die Entstehung neuer Steuerungsformen, die auf ICTs basieren. 
Virtuelle Organisationen wie Ushahidi oder FrontlineSMS beispielsweise ermöglichen die 
Erbringung kollektiver Güter auch ohne staatlich-hierarchische Strukturen, die in einem tra-
ditionellen Verständnis häufig als Voraussetzung von Governance betrachtet werden. Unser 
Fokus liegt somit auf Governance-Formen die auf kollektivem Handeln über elektronische 
Netzwerke basieren. Die Diskussion dieser Fragen wird durch die Ergebnisse von Forschun-
gsaufenthalten illustriert, die in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 in Afghanistan und verschiedenen 
afrikanischen Staaten stattgefunden haben. Das Paper endet mit einigen vorläufigen Hypoth-
esen zu der Verbindung von ICTs, Staatlichkeit und Governance.
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1. Introduction
When considering the effects of digital media on politics, scholars have tended to focus on 
technologies in areas with relatively consolidated state institutions, whether they being demo-
cratic or authoritarian in nature. As a result, research questions tend to cluster around ICT in 
relation to these institutions. For example, scholars have asked important questions about the 
changing nature of citizenship in a modern nation-state, the possibilities for more robust deli-
berative democracy, the changing nature of production and economic relations, Internet effects 
on electoral behavior and outcomes, and of course the role of technology in social change.
As important and interesting as these questions are, they overlook the fact that the ICT revolu-
tion has reached all parts of the world, including the non-OECD world where state institutions 
are often not fully consolidated in the Western sense. We use the term areas of limited statehood 
to describe geographical entities, policy fields or social groups for which states either cannot 
maintain a monopoly of force or experience significant problems with regard to rule-making, 
implementation and enforcement. 
Different questions emerge when considering the effects of ICT on areas of limited statehood 
in particular for governance, i.e. the delivery of collective goods and services. Governance is con-
ceptually distinct from the state, as we discuss below. Our paper thus asks the question: What 
role can ICT-enabled collective action play in filling the governance void found in areas of limited state-
hood? How do communities use ICT to meet the challenges of indiscriminant violence, disease, 
drought, famine, crime, and the other problems arising from deficient, non-responsive state 
institutions? Can ICT help to fill the gap between pressing human needs and some states’ ina-
bility to meet them?
This topic is both empirically and theoretically largely uncharted territory. We thus hope to 
begin a new conversation by drawing out the contours of an exciting and vibrant new area of 
inquiry. We begin that project with a discussion of our theoretical framework centered around 
governance and statehood (section 2). We then turn to a brief description of the technological 
advances particularly relevant for areas of limited statehood (section 3) before we evaluate the 
hitherto central theoretical role of the state (section 4) and the current theories on new collec-
tive action (section 5). We then present some empirical examples for technologically enabled go-
vernance modalities in areas of limited statehood (section 6) and move to our first ideas about 
the theoretical implications (section 7).
2. Statehood and Governance
Our discussion of ICT is presented in the context of a debate about the nature of governance, 
and not just government or the state. Our analysis rests on important distinctions among these 
three concepts. 
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As a topic of scholarly interest, governance has moved to the forefront of social science re-
search. A simple JSTOR search yields more than 3,200 scholarly articles on governance in jour-
nals from political science, public policy, and sociology, all published in the last five years. Yet 
despite – or perhaps because of this surge in interest – the contours of the topic are still soft 
and poorly defined. Governance is often confounded with government, which is also sometimes 
conflated with statehood.
We conceive of governance as conceptually independent of the state, allowing for an analysis of 
the relationship between the two. We define governance as institutionalized modes of social coordina-
tion that aim to produce and implement binding rules or provide collective goods. Such collective goods 
include security, economic welfare, education, public health, sustainable infrastructure, or a cle-
an and safe environment. From this perspective, government by the state is only one modality 
of governance, a modality that – on a global scale – may be the exception, rather than the rule.
Many contributions to (Western) governance research take certain core elements of mo-
dern statehood for granted. These elements usually comprise authoritative rule (in the sense 
of Krasner’s (1999) “domestic sovereignty”) and/or the fundamental ability to implement and 
enforce political decisions. Often overlooked by traditional research is the fact that, outside the 
OECD world, these assumptions do not hold. In fact, seen in a broader context, Western-style 
consolidated statehood is both an historical and contemporary exception. Even today, in most 
developing or transition countries (uniting more than three quarters of the global population) 
state or government control over the use of force is, at best, tenuous and incomplete, and so is 
the ability to implement any policy or regulation. To be sure, even within the West we might 
find pockets of limited statehood (such as police no-go-areas in inner cities). Implementation 
problems might even be considered a universal condition. But there is a qualitative gap between 
Western states and their generally well-established institutions on the one hand, and the vari-
ous challenges faced by their functional equivalents in non-Western states on the other hand.
However, “limited statehood” is a continuous variable, i.e. there is a world of difference between, 
say, Russia and Sudan. And yet, both experience problems with the monopoly of force and/or 
policy implementation and enforcement – albeit to varying degrees and in varying fields. It 
seems that many states marshal the capacity to deploy force but show less ability to provide for 
adequate nutrition, education, public safety, or economic development. Limited statehood thus 
refers to a condition where the state’s ability to implement and enforce the monopoly of force 
and/or political decisions is deficient in certain territorial regions, certain policy areas, or for 
certain segments of the population. 
When one ventures to the edges of Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Kabul 
in Afghanistan one has reached the limits of the state’s reach. Beyond the city borders lies a 
vast stretch of territory where the state is weak or altogether absent. In fact, in some places one 
does not have to venture from the capital to find little to no evidence of the state. Urban slums 
such as Kibera and Mathare in Nairobi offer examples of areas of limited statehood at the very 
heart of the territorial state. An area of limited statehood, however, might also refer to a policy 
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field or to a segment of the population rather than to a geographical entity. Examples include 
China’s problems with environmental policy, India’s inability to effectively control child labor, 
or Russia’s inability to manage its vast territory. 
However, limited, weak or even failing statehood does not necessarily translate into the absence 
of governance. Governance may simply take different forms, involving different actors and fol-
lowing different procedures than the Western, state-focused model implies. Governance can 
also work from below the state (be it by local self-governance, by NGOs or by business), it can 
work from above (by international governmental or non-governmental institutions) and it can 
take any form of collaboration with the state as it exists – even if it is very different from what we 
are familiar with in a Western context. Today, technologically enabled collective action may play 
an important role in such forms of governance. The collective goods of governance are usually 
delivered by collective action. Our hypothesis is that in the absence of strong state institutions, 
the availability of ICT makes a significant difference for the possibilities and forms of non-state 
collective action for the purposes of governance.
3. ICT in Areas of Limited Statehood
Situating our analysis in areas of limited statehood, rather than the OECD-world with its robust 
state institutions, allows us to expand the consideration of new media to digital technologies 
and applications that are most relevant to less developed regions. This includes mobile telepho-
ny (and mobile-based Internet access), remote sensing satellites, and geographical information 
systems (GIS). These are perhaps best thought of as nested technologies that create a “system 
of systems” array of capacities. For example, GIS and GPS constitute the foundational capacity 
for the use of mobile telephony in crowd-sourced event mapping platforms such as Ushahidi. 
Put differently, mobile phones are used to populate open source digital maps with markers of 
significant events or phenomena; much in the same way Google Maps marks locations of in-
terest to users.
The most salient of these technologies have a different profile from those found in the more 
intensely studied regions in the Global North. Chief among them is mobile telephony. In 2000, 
almost three quarters of global mobile phone subscriptions were found in the developed world. 
By 2010 the proportions were reversed, resembling much more the actual distribution of the 
world population. By mid-2010, there were over five billion mobile phone subscribers around 
the globe. Just one year later, the global total reached 5.6 billion subscriptions.1 In Africa alone, 
the proportion of mobile phone subscribers has increased tenfold during this time span and 
has reached well over a third of the entire population, and other regions of the less developed 
world consistently exhibit the highest growth rates (Livingston 2011). Africa has seen a 20 per-
1 “Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Connections Will Reach 5.6 Billion in 2011 as Mobile Data Services 
Revenue Totals $314.7 Billion,” August 4, 2011. http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1759714. Accessed 
March 2, 2012.
ICT in Areas of Limited Statehood |  8
cent rate of growth each year for the past five years, souring from 2 percent of the population in 
2000 to 28 percent by the end of 2009.2 
By the year 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa will have more people with mobile network access than 
with access to electricity at home, some 138 million people by 2015 (Rao 2011: 11). By 2020 the-
re will be at least one SIM card for every person on the continent (Salz 2011). MTN, a leading 
provider of mobile telephony service, offers an example of this phenomenal growth. In 2010, it 
announced a 22 percent increase (116 million in 2009 to 141.6 million in 2010) in its subscriber 
base. Similarly, with the purchase of Zain in 2010, Bharti Airtel, the world’s fifth largest tele-
communications company, expanded its presence into fifteen African nations. With about 40 
million subscribers on the continent in September 2010, Bharti planned to more than double 
the company’s Africa business in thirty months. In South Africa, Ghana, Gabon and Kenya, there 
are already nearly as many SIM cards as there are people. 
Although growth rates are slower, Internet access is also available to increasing proportions of the 
population. About 80 percent of global data transmission uses undersea cables. As of mid-2009, 
40 percent of continental Africa was without a direct high-bandwidth cable connection. Satellite 
uplinks were used instead but at rates that were twenty times more expensive than bandwidth 
prices in the United States. New sub-sea cable systems alter that pricing structure, opening up 
new opportunities for the growth of high-speed Internet and better cellular telephony. 
Leading-edge innovation centers are found now in various African cities. For example, Cape 
Town’s “Silicon Cape” has company in Nairobi’s “Silicon Savannah.” iHub, a technology inno-
vation center in Nairobi, is perhaps the most well known component of Nairobi’s emerging 
strength.3 Another is the Safaricom Academy, a joint venture between Safaricom and Strath-
more University. It hosts the “Incubation Center,” a technical and mentoring program for ICT 
entrepreneurs.4 What is perhaps the most ambitious ICT project in Africa is Konza City, a “tech-
nology city” planned for development about 60 miles outside of Nairobi.5 Google has also set up 
offices in several African countries and hired Ory Okolloh, the Kenyan lawyer and activist who 
sparked the creation of Ushahidi in 2008, as its director of Africa policy (Hopkins 2010). 
Google has also reported record growth for its operations in sub-Saharan Africa, benefiting 
from 50 percent annual growth in search requests. Not surprisingly, 40 percent of the Google 
searches come from mobile phones. Videos viewed on YouTube, another Google service, are also 
2 Most Africans use prepaid SIM cards. This creates some ambiguity as to what these numbers mean. 
For example, one can have a mobile phone subscription without having a mobile phone; or one can 
have multiple mobile phones and multiple subscriptions; or one can have a subscription without any 
minutes, and therefore effectively be without a phone. See James/Versteeg 2007,  and Harwood 2012.
3 For more about iHub, see http://ihub.co.ke/pages/about.php, and for CITI see http://www.citi.org.za/
about-citi.html. For a more general discussion of IT innovation centers see Livingston 2011: 27. See 
also Ahmed/Nwankwo 2010.
4 About Safaricom Academy, http://www.safaricomacademy.org/about.html. Accessed March 9, 2012.
5 Konza Technology City, Summary April 2011, http://www.doitinkenya.co.ke/pdf/Konza%20Summa-
ry%20Document.pdf. Accessed March 9, 2012.
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doubling each year. Google is not alone in its expansion in Africa. There were also approximate-
ly 10.5 million Facebook users there in 2010 (Rao 2011: 5). Twitter users in Africa have exploded 
in numbers. Portland Communications, an independent research firm, and Tweetminster, a 
social media data analytics firm, found that 11.5 million tweets originated from Africa during 
the last three months of 2011. Almost 60 percent of the tweets were sent from mobile devices.6 
Remote sensing satellites are also important to areas of limited statehood. Since 1999 a fleet of 
commercial high-resolution remote sensing satellites have come on line. Public availability 
of data from high-resolution remote sensing satellites has empowered non-state actors with a 
technical capability that was once the exclusive preserve of a few powerful states. For example, 
the Satellite Sentinel Project uses high-resolution remote sensing images provided by Digi-
talGlobe, one of the premier remote-sensing firms, to monitor human rights violations in the 
Sudan. From about 420 miles in space, each satellite captures images of objects on the ground 
as small as a typical microwave oven. Where roads systems are rudimentary and populations 
scattered, the ability to see phenomena on the ground from space enables new forms of go-
vernance. It allows for an entirely new image of the world to emerge and creates new technical 
possibilities when combined with other technologies. 
Another new politically significant capacity is found in widely available geographical information 
systems (GIS). In the West, scholars, technologists, and social critics grapple with the signifi-
cance of GIS in terms of privacy, social media, marketing, and navigation. In areas of limited 
statehood GIS is particularly interesting in the context of crisis or event mapping – the use 
of crowdsourcing to populate significant events on a digital map in the context of a natural 
disaster or political event. People who are caught up in crises use mobile phones and other 
communication devices to share awareness of local circumstances with a central aggregating 
platform, such as Ushahidi. 
The digital divide between the Global North and Global South has begun to narrow, as is evident 
in the data provided by the International Telecommunication Union’s International Develop-
ment Indicators (IDI) (ITU 2010: x). We are interested in how the growing reach of technology in 
areas of limited statehood affects collective action. Each of these technologies helps to change 
the information landscape across the planet, including the non-Western world where areas of 
limited statehood are most commonly found. By lowering information and collaboration costs, 
technologically enabled collective action and coordination possibly fill gaps in governance ca-
pacity left open by weak and inefficient state institutions. 
The political significance of these technologies is found in their ability to deepen the capabi-
lities for collective action. In the social science literature this is called “new collective action.” 
Before we discuss this in further detail, we look at the role of the state in research on collective 
action.
6 http://allafrica.com/stories/201201260001.html, Accessed July 30, 2012.
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4. ICT, Theory, and the State 
Scholars studying digital technology and collective action have tended to focus on some parts of 
the globe while leaving the rest out of mind. There are two very good reasons for this. The first 
is rather obvious: North America and Europe are where key technologies were first located and 
where, even today, they are most heavily concentrated, at least in their most advanced forms. 
This means that the kinds of questions asked and the assumptions behind them tended to re-
flect the political and economic geography of the technology, as much as they did the inherent 
qualities of the technologies or their possible effects. Very different patterns of technological 
diffusion have (and are) occurring in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia. 
Another important difference is found in the technologies themselves. In Africa and elsewhere 
in the developing world, mobile phones are far more common than are more costly computers. 
The other chief difference between the diffusion pattern in the West in the past twenty years 
and the more recent patterns in the non-Western world is found in the role of the state. Unlike 
in the West, the state often plays a less prominent role with regard to governance. 
In the West, the state has been both an enabler of technological development and a conceptual 
anchor for social science theory building. As an enabler of technological development, one need 
only recall that ARPANET was the product of research commissioned and supported by the 
United States Defense Department. Bell Labs, Sarnoff Labs, IBM, and other technology inno-
vators pursued projects that were directly connected to state objectives, especially concerning 
national defense. It was an era of big science funded by government research initiatives (Wagner 
2008; Arthur 2009). The connection between the state and technological development is not 
nearly as strong in much of Africa today, especially after telecommunications market liberali-
zation schemes began to take hold beginning in the last decade of the 20th century (Petrazzini 
1995).7 The source of much of the innovation seen in Africa today comes from the private sector, 
sometimes in partnership with non-profits such as iHub in Nairobi. 
Of greater importance to our present argument is the second role of the state. The state serves 
as a conceptual element of social science theory building concerning collective action. Eit-
her implicitly or explicitly, it is at the center of paradigmatic statements concerning political 
communication and collective action. This is of course reasonable and understandable, given 
the geographical focus of the research. The theory, like the technology, is rooted in the North 
American and European political experience. So as to underscore the difference between our 
current project and past research, we will take a moment to clarify the point.
In different ways, various tributaries of collective action and social movement theory came to-
gether around a shared assumption concerning the centrality of the state. For the mainstream 
theories of contentious politics, nation states serve as preconditions for social movement for-
7 See also Harsch 2000. As with so many other things, this claim is less true of South Africa where the 
state has been more involved in scientific pursuits, including nuclear research and development. 
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mation and collective action. A major influence on this thinking has been the important work 
of Charles Tilly, who argued in his 1978 classic From Mobilization to Revolution that collective 
action interacts with a set of necessary conditions for mobilization and chief among them was 
the rise of the consolidated national state (Tilly 1978: ch. 3, 4, and 6; Tarrow 2010: 18).
In The New Transnational Activism, Tarrow (2005) underscores the centrality of the state. The state 
emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries as both a handmaiden to capitalism and its sometimes-
reluctant regulator. It was necessary for war, preservation of domestic security and the produc-
tion of other public goods, and for extracting the taxes that would pay for it all. “Under this 
umbrella, national social movements emerged around the fulcrum of the nation-state.” (Tarrow 
2010: 18). It is only in the formation of the state that national expression of social movement 
protests could take root. Different kinds of states, Tilly tells us, call for different research foci. 
Some theories concern effects of ICT on democratic practices and state institutional structures 
in an attempt to deduce net effects.8 In other cases, the focus is on the potential effects of ICT 
on authoritarian states (Howard 2010; Morozov 2011).
Several theoretical traditions – from American political communication research to collective 
action and social movement theory, to international relations theory – are, appropriately, situ-
ated in the context of a political structure dominated by strong states and other hierarchical 
institutional structures, such as political parties, firms, and even traditional NGOs. 
What is missing is a theoretical framework for thinking about places in the world where ICT 
is common but stabilized states are not. This constitutes a new techno-political geography. For 
the first time, digital technology with the potential for significant governance effects is found 
where states are absent. The traditional tie between strong states and technology is weak, if not 
absent. We begin that discussion by drawing on the innovative theoretical work about collective 
action in the absence of hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations. While much of this work still 
assumes a strong state and corporations, we adapt the conversation to a different set of circum-
stances. In the absence of the state, the ultimate hierarchical organization, can technologically 
enabled groups organize to provide basic public goods?
5. New Collective Action
With the rapid diffusion of digital technology in the West at the turn of the century, political 
scientists and sociologists began seeing interesting new patterns in social protest movements. 
Groups and interests that, according to traditional models of collective action, would not be 
present began appearing at anti-globalization protests across Europe and the United States. 
Among the many things that were interesting about these new groups was their under-resour-
ced, yet still sizeable, presence at various protest actions. According to the assumptions of coll-
ective action, this wasn’t supposed to happen. 
8 See Bimber 2003; Hindman 2009; Bennett 2003 and 2005; Andrews/Edwards 2004. 
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Collective action is affected by the constraints and opportunities created by the relative abun-
dance of information and the ability to communicate it. Max Weber also spoke of the relation-
ship between the kinds of organizations and institutions that society needs to accomplish its 
goals and the nature of that society’s information infrastructure. Weber said that the reason for 
bureaucracy, the reason for large hierarchical institutions, is found in the nature of informa-
tion. Where information is hard to gather, manage, and distribute, one is more likely to find 
specialized command-and-control hierarchical institutions – bureaucracies – to manage it. The 
classical Weberian conception of bureaucracy is a “body of arrangements for organizing infor-
mation and communication into a system for rational decision making and administration.” 
(Bimber 2003: 95) Weber’s argument assumes that information is inchoate and inherently diffi-
cult to organize, making it costly to assimilate and manage over time. “Locating the right infor-
mation, storing it, and making it available within an organization at the right time and place to 
people with the skill or expertise to use it is a difficult task.” (Bimber 2003: 95)
Resource mobilization theory in the 1970s and 80s argued along these lines when claiming that 
collective action occurs only where and when adequate resources are available (McAdam 1982). 
The resource mobilization perspective “maintained that professionalized organizations that 
had full time, paid leadership and a nonexistent or paper membership base were central to mo-
vement mobilization, stability, and maturation.” (Schaefer Caniglia/Carmin 2005)
Yet mostly leaderless and loosely organized groups – if organized at all relative to expected 
requirements – were clearly present as early as the anti-WTO protests in Seattle. The key ex-
planatory variable seemed to be the information characteristics of the environment. Whether 
we speak of “post-bureaucratic politics,” (Bimber 2003) or “organizing without organizations,” 
(Shirky 2008) or “leveraging affordance,” (Earl/Kimport 2011) the conclusions are generally the 
same: the information environment affects the nature of organizations and the opportunities 
and constraints they face in collective action. 
Advances in various information technologies lowers the cost of gathering, creating, storing, re-
trieving and distributing information. That in turn creates opportunities for groups and iden-
tities to coalesce and coordinate with much lower costs than would have been the case in an 
earlier age. 
We take this same information dynamic and apply it to governance in areas of limited state-
hood. Our thesis is the same as Bimber’s when, nearly a decade ago, he wrote of information 
abundance and postbureaucratic forms of politics. 
“To the extent that the central functions of these private institutions involve the 
collection, management, or distribution of information under circumstances where 
information has been costly and asymmetrically distributed, the contemporary 
information revolution has the capacity to alter organizational structures. The 
result is a diminished role on many fronts for traditional organizations in politics.” 
(Bimber 2003: 21-22) 
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We extend this possibility to our consideration of areas of limited statehood in the contempora-
ry information environment. Rather than relying on information abundance and postbureau-
cratic forms of organization to consider the expanded capacity of new forms of collective action 
put to the articulation and organization of demands on states and corporations, we consider 
information abundance and new governance modalities in the pursuit of basic public goods. 
The question thus is whether non-hierarchical, technologically enabled organizational morphologies 
can create public goods (such as security) without the state? 
Information abundance through a variety of ICT-based effects changes almost everything we 
know about organizations, collective action, and the collection and distribution of information. 
The impediments to collective action involve costs in terms of the time, money, and expertise 
required to gain an understanding of what is needed, approaches to achieving it, who can help 
you achieve it, and so forth. Remove the encumbrances of scarcity and add the element of fluid 
distribution of information over electronic networks and one sees a new array of opportunities 
and constraints for scalable political action, including the provision of public goods. Abundant 
information leads to administrative structures – to the degree they exist – that are fluid, adapta-
ble to shifting constraints and opportunities on a global scale, and open to rapidly formed and 
dissolved coalitions, movements, and networks. Reliance on vertical organizational structures 
is reduced and boundaries between core organizational elements and other organizations are 
more permeable. Institutions of all types become flatter, less hierarchical, fluid, open to rapid 
response to new inputs, and scalable from local to global phenomena. Complex and expensive 
organizations are not needed to the same extent, as they once were, if they are needed at all, 
where the information environment is rich with technologically enabled connections. That is 
because coordination of complex movements is done via electronic networks, rather than hie-
rarchical chain of command systems. 
6. Examples of Networked Governance Modalities
We lack the space and time to provide anything more than a few illustrative examples of tech-
nologically enabled governance modalities in action. The basic facts of each are the same: go-
vernment capacities are weak or missing. In that vacuum technologically enabled governance 
(or collective action) modalities fill the void.
(1) Banking and even basic currency liquidity is possible only where the state is capable of pro-
viding elemental structural context. This is especially true in today’s global economy. But even 
at an elementary level, one not approaching international currency exchange protocols on the 
use of credit cards and ATM cards, the state is essential to banking. For example, without basic 
infrastructure – roads, electrical grids, communication lines, police – banking is impossible. 
Furthermore, without proper regulation, oversight, and audits by independent agencies, ban-
king is impossible. Without banking, currency liquidity is challenged. Instead, barter systems 
are relied on for basic transactions. Furthermore, wealth is stored and accumulated in traditi-
onal ways that make them vulnerable. For example, without currency and banking, pastoralist 
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societies continue to concentrate excess value in cattle, making the stored wealth vulnerable 
to disease, draught, and theft.9 In Kenya, M-Pesa, a mobile phone-based cash system offered by 
Safaricom, was commercially launched in 2007. Pesa is money or cash in Swahili. Users can de-
posit and withdraw cash from authorized M-Pesa agents, make person-to-person money trans-
fers, and purchase mobile phone airtime. Mobiles in the Global South are used most often as 
“pay as you go systems”, rather than on monthly contracts, as is often the case in the Global 
North. M-Pesa is used in Kenya, Tanzania, and Afghanistan. By May 2009, it had 2 million daily 
transactions in Kenya alone. As of November 2011, M-Pesa had over 14 million subscribers and 
well over 28,000 agents across the country.10 In Tanzania, M-Pesa had about 9 million subscri-
bers in 2012.11  It is used to buy prenatal care for pregnant women, pay for school and supplies, 
buy commodities, and store excess wealth. Directly and indirectly, M-Pesa, built on the recent 
introduction of mobile telephony in Africa, is a new kind of organization, one that exists in the 
capacity of technologically enabled networks. Following the success of M-Pesa, similar systems 
have been developed by mobile service providers across the continent. MTN, Zain, Vodacom 
Tanzania, and Rwandatel have all followed suit. 
(2) Ushahidi offers an example of a network-based crowdsourcing platform that can be adap-
ted to a number of situations. It emerged in 2008 in the midst of the post-election violence 
in Kenya. Kenyan bloggers and technologists created a mash-up of open source geographical 
information systems mapping to record and aggregate various kinds of violence. Since then, 
Ushahidi has been used in a wide variety of circumstances, from monitoring wildfires in Russia 
in 2010 to tracking human needs in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010. Nearly 40,000 indepen-
dent reports were sent to the Ushahidi Haiti Project of which nearly 4,000 distinct events were 
plotted on the GIS platform. Ushahidi has also been used to track anti-immigrant violence in 
South Africa in 2008 as well as violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Marwaha 2008). 
It even has been used to track pharmacy stocks in several East African countries (Banks 2009). 
And it was also used to monitor the 2011 elections in Nigeria and called Reclaimnaija.12 
(3) FrontlineSMS is an open-source software that is used to collect and distribute information 
on standard mobile phones using text messages. It does not require an Internet connection. It 
allows users to connect a range of mobile devices to a computer to send and receive SMS text 
messages. If Internet access is available, FrontlineSMS can be connected to online SMS services 
and set up to feed incoming messages to other web or e-mail services. It has been used in a 
variety of circumstances, all characterized by the remoteness of the users, a lack of state ser-
9 “South Sudan: Cattle Rustling Becomes Increasingly Violent,” Institute for Security Studies, AllAfrica, 
February 1, 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201202011223.html. Accessed March 15, 2012.
10 “M-Pesa Transactions Surpass Western Union, Moves Across the Globe,” Saturday Nation, October 20, 
2011. http://www.nation.co.ke/business/news/-/1006/1258864/-/4hyt6qz/-/index.html. Accessed March 
15, 2012.
11 “Tanzania: Vodacom Upgrades M-Pesa System,” AllAfrica, January 16, 2012. http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/201201170470.html. Accessed March 15, 2012.
12 “Using the Ushahidi Platform to Monitor the Nigeria Elections 2011,” Ushahidi, http://blog.ushahidi.
com/index.php/2011/03/30/using-the-ushahidi-platform-to-monitor-the-nigeria-elections-2011/. Ac-
cessed March 15, 2012.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 38 • September 2012  |  15
vices, and an otherwise isolated and scattered population. In the absence of a state agricultural 
assistance service, common in the United States and Europe, a variety NGOs have established 
farmer information services. The Grameen Foundation’s Community Knowledge Workers Ini-
tiative, for example, provides farmers with information about crops, international market pri-
ces, and other services via mobile phones.13
(4) A similar technology, RapidSMS, was developed as a communication tool for UNICEF’s Glo-
bal Operations Center as a way to contact its teams in the field via SMS. With the proper equip-
ment, it can record and store audio voice messages that can then be redistributed by commu-
nity radio stations. One example of RapidSMS is the Jokko Initiative. It allows users to send 
an SMS text message to an access portal that then forwards the message to all phone numbers 
belonging to the network. In Somalia, a RapidSMS project for emergency response monitoring 
was set up. In Kenya, it is being used to address mortality rates of children under five years of 
age at a community level. “This initiative brings diagnoses, referrals and treatment out of the 
clinics and into the communities.” In Nigeria, RapidSMS was piloted in the first phase of a 70 
million “long lasting insecticide-treated nets” distribution campaign.14 Healthcare projects also 
rely on mobile telephony. 
(5) In 2011, the World Health Organization released a major study on the use of mobile techno-
logies in less developed regions. It concluded, “The use of mobile and wireless technologies to 
support the achievement of health objectives (mHealth) has the potential to transform the face 
of health service delivery across the globe.” The report continued:
“A powerful combination of factors is driving this change. These include rapid 
advances in mobile technologies and applications, a rise in new opportunities for 
the integration of mobile health into existing eHealth services, and the continued 
growth in coverage of mobile cellular networks.” (WHO 2011) 
The head of WHO’s Global Observatory for eHealth in Geneva estimates that mobile health ser-
vices are now found in up to 40 African countries. “The momentum is huge. What is happening 
is important. Millions of people in Africa still do not have access to any healthcare. With mobile 
technology they can at least have some.” (Smith 2011) TxtAlert, for example, is a mobile tool that 
sends unique, automated SMS reminders to patients on medication for chronic diseases. Pati-
ents can also “ping” their healthcare provider. Pinging is an unconnected call used commonly 
in prepaid mobile systems to communicate simple messages, such as “Call me because I’m out 
of minutes and cannot call you.” There are other ways of overcoming call charges that might get 
in the way of mobile-based healthcare. In Ghana, funding from an American university provi-
des free mobile-to-mobile voice and text services between the 2,000 physicians who serve the 
country’s 24 million people (Smith 2011). The mHealth Alliance projects include a SMS-based 
13 “Grameen Foundation Expands Technology Program for Poor Farmers in Uganda,” http://www.
grameenfoundation.org/grameen-foundation-expands-technology-program-poor-farmers-uganda. 
Accessed March 15, 2012.
14 http://www.rapidsms.org/overview/. Accessed March 15, 2012.
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drug-counterfeit checker developed by HP; communications systems that connect patients to 
their doctors or send SMS alerts on the spread of local diseases; and SIMpill, a sensor-equipped 
pill dispenser that informs clinics if patients fail to take their medications. This is especially 
important in the treatment of TB and other potential drug-resistant diseases. Partial treatment 
of TB leads to the development of a strain of the disease that resists the previously used treat-
ment regiment.15 
(6) Where Internet service is available, several of these technologies come together to empower com-
munities against the harsher aspects of day-to-day life in areas where the government is both 
weak and corrupt. Bribing for basic government services, one of the common indicators of a 
weak state, is endemic in many parts of the world. “The going rate to get a child who has already 
passed the entrance requirements into high school in Nairobi, Kenya? 20,000 shillings. The ex-
pense of obtaining a driver’s license after having passed the test in Karachi, Pakistan? 3,000 ru-
pees.” (Strom 2012) Crowdsourced monitoring systems such as ipaidabribe.com, operated by a 
nonprofit organization called Janaagraha in India, allow citizens to submit anonymous reports 
of petty bribes.16 The Cleen Foundation, an anti-corruption, crime, and police reform nonprofit 
in Nigeria, has established a pilot project called “StoptheBribes!”. As one drives about Lagos one 
encounters police in the numerous roundabouts at intersections. Rather than regulate traffic, 
the ostensible purpose of the police presence, the police use it as an opportunity to troll for 
bribes, pulling over prospects as they pass by. Several police officers surround the vehicle, with 
one often getting in. At that point, the driver is ordered to a nearby lot that serves as the sha-
kedown area.17  Uniformed officers are generally unseen in this area. Large and menacing men 
block the exit, preventing drivers from leaving without the approval of those running the ope-
ration. In response to this practice, the Cleen Foundation’s “StoptheBribes!” Campaign is inten-
ded to crowdsource information gathering about the time, location, and offending officers who 
solicit bribes in this manner. The officers who flag down cars wear uniforms with badges and 
nametags. If not during the shakedown, drivers will send the key information to Cleen, who will 
then use aggregated and geographically displayed totals in an effort to shutdown the practice.
These technologies tap into the social power of groups that are now connected, or at least po-
tentially connected, by simple but effective electronic means. Most often, it is simple SMS ag-
gregator systems such as FrontlineSMS, RapidSMS, or Ushahidi. But the question remains, do 
these systems rise to the level of governance? Do we see a low to zero cost system of collective 
action put to the provision of public goods? There are hundreds, thousands of ICT-enabled 
collective action initiatives found across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Do these initiatives 
rise to the level of a new modality of governance in areas of limited statehood? We address this 
question in the final section.
15 http://www.simpill.com/. Accessed March 18, 2012.
16 http://ipaidabribe.com/. Accessed March 15, 2012.
17 In the course of conducting research for this study in May 2011, one of the authors was repeatedly 
caught up in these bribing operations while riding with staff members of the Cleen Foundation. The 
description is based on this experience. 
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7. Conclusion: A New Governance Modality?
Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimport (2011) draw distinctions among three levels of technologi-
cally enabled collective action. We can use their distinctions to draw preliminary answers to the 
question we pose above.
First, E-mobilizations look very much like mobilizations from an earlier era – demonstrations, 
sit-ins, and other forms of protest – exception they make use of the greater efficiencies afforded 
by technology. Technology facilitates coordination at much reduced costs. Whether one sends 
an email to one person or a thousand, the cost is the same. 
United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ), a coalition of over 1,300 organizations, used the Web to 
facilitate and coordinate a massive 2007 march on Washington in just over two months. The 
1963 civil rights march on Washington, on the other hand, “was comparatively more costly to 
produce because none of the logistics could benefit from the cost- and time-savings tools that 
online coordination makes possible. In essence, having a Web presence allowed UFPJ to con-
duct collective action at a lower cost, on a larger scale, and more quickly than it could have done 
without the Web.” (Earl/Kimport 2011: 5) In this way, technology is used to facilitate face-to-face, 
in the street protest and civic action. 
There are, however, important limits to what technology can accomplish in E-mobilizations. 
In collective action mobilizations for the purpose of social protest, people still must gather 
together, be present in the protest, perhaps be arrested, go hungry, and generally pay the costs 
of participation. Online facilitation is powerful to the point of meeting the offline realities of collective 
action.
Earl and Kimport also describe E-movements. E-movements are ontologically embedded in elec-
tronic networks. Indeed, they are facilitated, created, and sustained by technology. Whereas the 
lower transaction costs of E-mobilizations clearly benefit from technologically facilitated effici-
encies, E- movements are wholly dependent on them for their existence. For example, whereas 
the civil rights movement in America or the Solidarity movement in Poland existed without the 
benefit of technologically enabled networks, “We are all Khalid Said,” one of the more promi-
nent protest platforms in Egypt, would not have existed without a Web platform, in this case 
Facebook. E-movements may help inspire other forms of collective action, or they may not.
Earl and Kimport also discuss E-Tactics. This is a middle ground between E-mobilizations and 
E-movements. It is characterized, they say, by considerable variability in the use of the affor-
dances provided by technological networks. “How much a movement reaps the rewards of cost 
and copresence afforded overall will vary by how extensively it uses these e-tactics and the struc-
ture of the e-tactics themselves.” (Earl/Kimport 2011: 13)
In sum, in the case of E-mobilizations, technology lowers the cost and helps facilitate the mo-
vement of people or things as needed within the context of the action; in the case of E-move-
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ments, the collective action objective is located almost entirely online. The collective outcomes 
are completely informational.
Earl and Kimport differentiate levels of collective action outcomes by use of what they call af-
fordances. An “affordance” is “the type of action or a characteristic of actions that a technology 
enables through its design.” (Earl/Kimport 2011: 10) There are two primary affordances. The first 
is a “sharply reduced cost for creating, organizing, and participating in protests. It is about the 
radical reduction in the costs associated with starting and scaling up an “organization.” Given 
the historical association with organizational morphology and costs, with the very purpose and 
structure of organization reflective of start-up and scaling costs of collective action, radically 
reduced costs means that the nature and purpose of organizations are also affected. The first 
affordable is about start-up and scaling costs. Technologically enabled networks benefit from 
low to no cost communication and coordination, whether it involves two persons or thousands. 
The costs remain the same. Each additional unit added to the action costs the same as the first. 
We see these characteristics at work in E-Mobilizations.
The second sort of affordance is found in the ability to aggregate people’s individual actions 
into broader collective actions without requiring participants to be co-present in time and 
space. More importantly, technologically enabled networks can take advantage of incrementa-
lism: the ability to parlay small individual actions spread out across a network and across time 
into major collective, coordinated actions. Wikipedia, for example, is the most commonly cited 
example of incremental effects of many contributors to a large-scale project. It would also seem 
that the various Ushahidi deployments and many if not all of the mobile phone initiatives could 
be characterized in this way. 
A complete inventory of various collective action initiatives that, to varying degrees, rely on 
technological facilitation goes well beyond what we can do in this paper. What we can do, ho-
wever, is use the logic of Earl and Kimport’s typology to begin to address the question we po-
sed above. Do the collective action initiatives discussed above, such as mHealth and Ushahidi 
deployments, rise to the level of a new modality of governance in areas of limited statehood? 
In order to evaluate this, it is meaningful to consider the different forms governance can take 
in areas of limited statehood (cf. Risse 2011) and the different goods of governance. First: When 
the state is weak, governance arrangements can (a) still work with what’s left of the state, e.g. in 
public-private-partnerships. Alternatively governance can (b) come from below the state and be 
provided as local-self governance (cf. Ostrom 1990), by non-governmental actors or by business. 
And finally – and in the more extreme cases of state weakness – governance services can be pro-
vided (c) from above the state, by multilateral or bilateral aid agencies or by transnational NGOs. 
ICT works particularly in favor of non-state actors, i.e. in favor of (b) and in favor of the non-
state actors in (a) and (c). In these cases, ICT is significantly lowering transaction costs which 
is extremely important in overcoming co-ordination and communication problems. Examples 
include the formation of any kind of NGO as well as the co-ordination of, say, relief efforts bet-
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ween them. The same might apply to self-governance of common pool resources for which we 
know communication to be a central condition for success. 
Secondly, one has to consider the different nature of the collective goods that governance is 
supposed to provide. Most important in this regard is the question whether these goods are 
(only) about information or whether they are about material objects. The above example of the 
M-Pesa banking system constitutes a case where the object of governance (a banking system) 
is immaterial in that credits and accounts themselves are information. Or consider Stopthe-
Bribes!. The possibility of exchanging information about bribery practices might in itself red-
uce bribery in that it might deter such practices. This, however, only works if the person asking 
for a bribe fears offline or online sanctions which might have tangible effects (such as public 
shaming).In such cases ICT plays a particularly important role in that the information system 
itself constitutes a collective good. ICT thus truly enables governance itself.
By contrast, food relief or vaccination programs are quite different. They are not only about 
information. They ultimately require not only the movement of “bits” but the movement of 
“atoms”. Here ICT can still play an extremely important role on the “bit-side”, i.e. in creating 
a (non-state) governance institution, facilitating its actions, supporting self-organization etc. 
Consider the case of the Ushahidi deployment to address the needs of stricken population 
in the 2010 Russian wildfires. Citizens on their own responded to the needs of other citizens 
according to what they learned from postings on the platform. Needed supplies were distribut-
ed in a collective action initiative created and supported almost entirely by information provi-
ded on the platform (Asmolov 2010). But also in this case whether we see governance outcomes 
depends on the question whether the respective governance arrangement can move from the 
bits to the atoms, in other words whether – after all the information has been exchanged – ma-
terial and money are being moved. 
Not that not all goods of governance fall neatly in the categories “bits” or “atoms”. Consider 
security, arguably one of the most central goods of governance. Here, the more possibility of 
information exchange (based on crowd sourcing) about, say, the movement of a rebel group 
in a certain region (out of state control) and the possibility to communicate this to, say, inter-
national actors with the ability of military action can deter certain activities that would have 
otherwise taken place (such as pillaging). In other words: The provision of security can remain 
on the information side and only has to be structurally backed up by “atoms”, in this case in the 
form of military capabilities. Or consider the mHealthcare initiatives. In some cases the mere 
information exchange about self-treatment allows patients or their families in remote villages 
to come to terms with some medical problems. In many other and more difficult cases, however, 
information exchange is not enough. Doctors and medication have to be brought to such vil-
lages or the patients to clinics. This requires material resources, which an ICT-system in itself 
does not provide.
As a preliminary conclusion, we would thus say that the answer to the question whether ICT 
enabled collective action in areas of limited statehood constitutes a new modality of governance 
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is (as usual) “it depends.” ICT enabled collective action is less relevant as long as states or state 
institutions are still heavily involved. And for many goods of governance ICT might facilitate 
many things but at the end of the day such structures alone will not move atoms. However, ICT 
enabled collective action can constitute a new modality of governance particularly in non-state 
based governance arrangements where the effects of the low transaction cost are particularly 
strong. And particularly for those goods of governance which either are immaterial in nature 
(i.e. information based) or which only need structural framework conditions for information to 
lead to behavioral changes that in themselves constitute governance.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 38 • September 2012  |  21
ICT in Areas of Limited Statehood |  22
Literature
Ahmed, Allam/Nwankwo, Sonny (Eds.) 2010: Achieving Sustainable Development in Africa: Science, 
Technology & Innovation Trajectory, Brighton.
Andrews, Kenneth T./Edwards, Bob 2004: Advocacy Organizations in the U.S. Political Process, in: 
Annual Review of Sociology 30: 479-506.
Arthur, W. Brian 2009: The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves, New York, NY.
Asmolov, Gregory 2010: “Russia: Crowdsourcing Assistance for Victims of Wildfires,” Ushahidi 
Blog, August 2, 2010. http://blog.ushahidi.com/index.php/2010/08/02/russia-crowdsour-
cing-assistance-for-victims-of-wildfires/. Accessed March 18, 2012.
Banks, Ken 2009: “Mobiles Help Put a Stop to Drug Stock-outs,” PC World, July 31, 2009. http://
www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/169416/mobiles_help_put_a_stop_to_drug_
stockouts.html.
Bennett, W. Lance 2003: Communicating Global Activism: Strengths and Vulnerabilities of Net-
worked Politics, in: Information, Communication, and Society 6: 2, 143-168. 
Bennett, W. Lance 2005: Social Movements Beyond Borders: Understanding Two Eras of Transna-
tional Activism, in: Della Porta, Donatella/Tawwor, Sidney (Eds.): Transnational Protest 
and Global Activism, Lanham, MD: 203-226.
Bimber, Bruce 2003: Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Po-
litical Power. New York, NY
Earl, Jennifer/Kimport, Katrina 2011: Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet 
Age, Cambridge, MA.
Harsch, Ernest  2000: Privatization shifts gears in Africa, in: Africa Recovery, 14: 1, 8-17; http://www.
un.org/en/africarenewal/subjindx/141priv.htm. Accessed March 15, 2012.
Harwood, Asch 2012: Defining Mobile Phone Usage in Africa, The Future Forum, February 16, 
2012; http://thefutureforum.org/technology/defining-mobile-phone-usage-in-africa/. 
Accessed March 2, 2012.
Hindman, Matthew 2009: The Myth of Digital Democracy, Princeton, NJ. 
Hopkins, Curt 2010: Google Hires Kenyan Activist to Shape Africa Policy,” ReadWriteWeb, De-
cember 24, 2010. http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/google_hires_kenyan_activist_
to_shape_africa_polic.php. Accessed March 9, 2012.
Howard, Philip N. 2010: The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Tech-
nology and Political Islam, Oxford. 
ITU (International Telecommunication Union) 2010: Measuring the Information Society: 2010, Ge-
neva.
James, Jeffrey/Versteeg, Mila 2007: Mobile Phones in Africa: How Much Do We Really Know?, So-
cial Indicators Research 84: 1, 117-126. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999: Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ.
Livingston, Steven 2011: Africa’s Evolving Infosystems: A Pathway to Security and Stability, Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies Research Paper No. 2, Washington, DC.
Marwaha, Alka 2008: “Web tool maps Congo conflict,” BBC News, December 10, 2008. http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7773648.stm. Accessed March 15, 2012.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 38 • September 2012  |  23
McAdam, Doug 1982: Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 
Chicago, IL.
Morozov, Evgeny 2011: The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, Philadelphia, PA.
Ostrom, Elinor 1990: Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective ac-
tion, New York, NY.
Petrazzini, Ben A. 1995: The Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform in Developing 
Countries: Privatization and Liberalization in Comparative Perspective, Westport, CN. 
Rao, Madanmohan 2011: Mobile Africa Report 2011: Regional Hubs of Excellence and Inno-
vation, MobileMonday, http://www.healthunbound.org/sites/default/files/MobileAfri-
ca_2011.pdf. March 9, 2012.
Risse, Thomas (Ed.) 2011: Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited 
Statehood, New York, NY. 
Salz, Peggy Anne 2011: Praekelt’s Jonathan McKay: Africa Leads In ‘Participation’ Mobile Marke-
ting, http://www.mobilegroove.com/praekelts-jonathan-mckay-africa-leads-in-partici-
pation-mobile-marketing-9700, Accessed June 23, 2012.
Schaefer Caniglia, Beth/Carmin, JoAnn 2005: Scholarship on Social Movements Organizations: 
Classic Views and Emerging Trends, in: Mobilization: An International Journal 10: 2, 
201-212. 
Shirky, Clay 2008: Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations, 
New York, NY.
Smith, Alex Duval 2011: Mobile Health Offers Hope to Patients in Africa,” The Guardian, June 
8, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jun/08/mobile-phone-
healthcare-africa. Accessed March 18, 2012.
Strom, Stephanie 2012: “Web Sites Shine Light on Petty Bribery Worldwide,” The New York Times, 
March 6, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/web-sites-shine-light-on-
petty-bribery-worldwide.html?hpw. Accessed March 15, 2012. 
Tarrow, Sidney 2005: The New Transnational Activism, New York, NY. 
Tarrow, Sidney 2010: Power in Movement, Cambridge, 19th edition.
Tilly, Charles 1978: From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, MA.
Wagner, Caroline 2008: The New Invisible College: Science for Development, Washington, DC. 
WHO 2011: mHealth: New Horizons for Health Through Mobile Technologies. Global Obser-
vatory for eHealth Series Vol. 3. http://www.who.int/goe/publications/goe_mhealth_web.
pdf. Accessed March 18, 2012.
ICT in Areas of Limited Statehood |  24
Previously published Working Papers from the SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Schüren, Verena 2012: Two TRIPs to Innovation. Pharmaceutical Innovation Systems in India and Brazil, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 37, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Sonderforschungsbereich 700: Grundbegriffe der Governanceforschung, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 36, 2. 
revised edition, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Eimer, Thomas R. 2012: When Modern Science Meets Traditional Knowledge: A Multi-Level Process of Adaption and Resi-
stance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 35, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Kötter, Matthias 2012: Non-State Justice Institutions: A Matter of Fact and a Matter of Legislation, SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 34, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Koehler, Jan 2012: Social Order Within and Beyond the Shadows of Hierarchy. Governance-Patchworks in Afghanistan, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 33, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
Risse, Thomas 2012: Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood. Actors, Modes, Institutions, and Resources, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 32, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2012.
Hönke, Jana, with Thomas, Esther 2012: Governance for Whom? – Capturing the Inclusiveness and Unintended Effects of 
Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 31, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2012.
Contreras Saíz, Mónika/Hölck, Lasse/Rinke, Stefan 2012: Appropriation and Resistance Mechanisms in (Post-) Colonial Con-
stellations of Actors: The Latin American Frontiers in the 18th and 19th Century, SFB-Governance Working Paper 
Series, No. 30, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2012.
Börzel, Tanja 2012: How Much Statehood Does it Take – and What For?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 29, Re-
search Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2012.
Prigge, Judit 2012: Friedenswächter. Institutionen der Streitbeilegung bei den Amhara in Äthiopien, SFB-Governance Wor-
king Paper Series, No. 28, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2012.
Jacob, Daniel/Ladwig, Bernd/Oldenbourg, Andreas 2012: Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited 
Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 27, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2012.
Schmelzle, Cord 2011: Evaluating Governance. Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 26, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2011.
Börzel, Tanja A./Hönke, Jana 2011: From Compliance to Practice. Mining Companies and the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 25, Re-
search Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2011.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 38 • September 2012  |  25
Draude, Anke/Neuweiler, Sonja 2010: Governance in der postkolonialen Kritik. Die Herausforderung lokaler Vielfalt jenseits 
der westlichen Welt, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 24, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, May 2010.
 
Börzel, Tanja A. 2010: Governance with/out Government. False Promises or Flawed Premises?, SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 23, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2010.
Wilke, Boris 2009: Governance und Gewalt. Eine Untersuchung zur Krise des Regierens in Pakistan am Fall Belutschistan, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 22, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2009.
Schneckener, Ulrich 2009: Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 21, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2009.
Mueller-Debus, Anna Kristin/Thauer, Christian R./Börzel, Tanja A. 2009: Governing HIV/AIDS in South Africa. The Role of Firms, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 20, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2009.
Nagl, Dominik/Stange, Marion 2009: Staatlichkeit und Governance im Zeitalter der europäischen Expansion. Verwaltungs-
strukturen und Herrschaftsinstitutionen in den britischen und französischen Kolonialimperien, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 19, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2009.
Börzel, Tanja A./Pamuk, Yasemin/Stahn, Andreas 2008: The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in its 
Near Abroad. One Size Fits All?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 18, Research Center (SFB) 700, Ber-
lin, December 2008.
Koehler, Jan 2008: Auf der Suche nach Sicherheit. Die internationale Intervention in Nordost-Afghanistan, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 17, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2008.
Beisheim, Marianne/Fuhr, Harald (ed.) 2008: Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher Akteure. Entste-
hungsbedingungen, Effektivität und Legitimität sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, 
No. 16, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, August 2008.
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne 2008: Transitional Justice als Weg zu Frieden und Sicherheit. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 15, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, July 2008.
Beisheim, Marianne/Dingwerth, Klaus 2008: Procedural Legitimacy and Private Transnational Governance. Are the Good Ones 
Doing Better?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 14, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2008.
Benecke, Gudrun/Branović, Željko/Draude, Anke 2008: Governance und Raum. Theoretisch-konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur 
Verräumlichung von Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 13, Research Center (SFB) 700, 
Berlin, May 2008.
Schuppert, Gunnar Folke 2008: Von Ko-Produktion von Staatlichkeit zur Co-Performance of Governance. Eine Skizze zu ko-
operativen Governance-Strukturen von den Condottieri der Renaissance bis zu Public Private Partnerships, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 12, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2008.
ICT in Areas of Limited Statehood |  26
Trebesch, Christoph 2008: Economic Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 11, Research Center (SFB) 700, 
Berlin, May 2008.
Benecke, Gudrun/Friberg, Lars/Lederer, Markus/Schröder, Miriam 2008: From Public-Private Partnership to Market. The Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) as a New Form of Governance in Climate Protection, SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 10, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2008.
Hönke, Jana/Kranz, Nicole/Börzel, Tanja A./Héritier, Adrienne 2008: Fostering Environmental Regulation? Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Countries with Weak Regulatory Capacities. The Case of South Africa, SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 9, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2008.
Sonderforschungsbereich 700 (ed.) 2007: Grundbegriffe. Ein Beitrag aus dem Teilprojekt A1, SFB-Governance Working Paper 
Series, No. 8, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2007.
Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph 2007: Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results from a Re-
presentative Survey, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 7, DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, Octo-
ber 2007.
Schäferhoff, Marco/Campe, Sabine/Kaan, Christopher 2007: Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relati-
ons. Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks and Results, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 6, 
DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, August 2007.
Risse, Thomas 2007: Regieren in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Zur „Reisefähigkeit“ des Governance-Konzeptes, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 5, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2007.
Ladwig, Bernd/Jugov, Tamara/Schmelzle. Cord 2007: Governance, Normativität und begrenzte Staatlichkeit, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 4, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2007.
Kötter, Matthias 2007: Der Governance-Raum als Analysefaktor – am Beispiel von „Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit“, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 3, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2007.
Draude, Anke 2007: How to Capture Non-Western Forms of Governance: In Favour of an Equivalence Functionalist Observa-
tion of Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 2, Research Center 
(SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2007. [German version available]
Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula 2006: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: New Forms of Governance? Research Pro-
gram or the Research Center (SFB) 700, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 1, Research Center (SFB) 700, 
Berlin, December 2006. [German version available]
These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered in printed versions via e-
mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 38 • September 2012  |  27
The Authors
Steven Livingston is Professor of Me-
dia and Public Affairs and Professor of 
Media and International Affairs in the 
School of Media and Public Affairs and 
the Elliott School of International Affairs 
at The George Washington University in 
Washington, DC. His research in recent 
years has focused on information and 
information technology and governance, human rights, and 
political conflict. His most recent books are “When the Press 
Fails” (with Lance Bennett and Regina Lawrence) and “Africa’s 
Evolving Infosystems.” He holds a PhD from the University of 
Washington.
Contact: sliv@gwu.edu
Gregor Walter-Drop is Managing Di-
rector of the Collaborative Research 
Center (SFB) 700 „Governance in 
Areas of Limited Statehood“. He has 
specialized in International Relations 
and has published and taught in the 
fields of globalization, foreign policy 
analysis, governance and limited 
statehood. He holds a PhD from the University of Bremen 
and Masters Degrees from the University of Tübingen and the 
State University of New York.
Contact: gregor.walter@fu-berlin.de
Governance has become a central theme in social science 
research. The Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas 
of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of li-
mited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed 
states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of 
colonies. How and under what conditions can governance 
deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what 
problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and 
financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the 
Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the 
University of Potsdam, the European University Institute, 
the Hertie School of Governance, the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (SWP), and the Social Sci-
ence Research Center Berlin (WZB). 
Research Framework of the Research Center (SFB) 700 Partner Organizations of the Research Center (SFB) 700
Host University:
Freie Universität Berlin
University of Potsdam
Hertie School of Governance
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP)
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
